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I. Introduction 
 
1. Core Questions and Answers  
One of the most significant challenges for modern legal scholarship is to consider how 
disruptive new (especially digital) technologies1 are for existing legal regimes. In order to 
tackle this challenge, one particular new technology, 3D-printing has been chosen as a case 
study here. 3D-printing brings potentially radical changes to the consumer goods market: new 
forms of production, new types of producer and a greater role for digital content. This paper 
considers what these changes should mean for the underpinning values of consumer law, and 
what this in turn should mean for consumer private law doctrine: as will be explained further 
below, there has been very limited work so far on these issues, and the work that has been 
done is grounded in a very limited understanding of consumer law values. We argue that the 
values currently underpinning our consumer protection regime in relation to consumer goods 
should guide our response to the challenges of new technology.   
The law on consumer goods is currently underpinned to a significant degree by the need ethic 
(prioritising protection of consumers as vulnerable parties, over business self-interest and 
consumer self-reliance 2 ). This is manifest in strict and quasi-strict liability standards. 
Notwithstanding 3D-printing innovations, there is a good case for adherence to the need ethic: 
The risks (of poor quality and unsafe goods) are as high as before (or higher); consumers are 
as vulnerable (or more so) than before; and there is insufficient evidence that the need ethic 
undermines innovation.  
What are the implications of this at doctrinal level? We will argue in this paper that, despite 
the innovative aspects of 3D-printing, the law can often continue to reflect the need ethic via 
existing legal principles (current strict and quasi strict liability standards), subject to some 
extensions (e.g. as to supplier and producer liability for digital content), and through 
clarifications of existing legal rules and principles (e.g. as to who counts as a professional 
business supplier). However, to ensure that the need ethic is respected fully in all aspects of 
this technology, the law may need to go beyond these clarifications and modest extensions. 
For example, the increasing difficulty of locating the source of a quality or safety problem and 
                                               
* Respectively, Chair Professor of Commercial and Dean, City Law School, City University of Hong Kong; Professor 
of International Commercial Law, University of Warwick; Professor of Commercial Law, University of Essex. The 
authors would like to thank Hugh Beale, Roger Brownsword, Hans Micklitz and Onyeka Osuji for reading and 
commenting on earlier versions of this paper. As always, responsibility for the final product rests with the authors 
alone. 
1 “Disruptive” in the sense that it disrupts/changes pre-existing patterns of production and supply: see Christensen, 
The Innovator’s Dilemma (Harvard Business Review Press, 1997) 
2 See Willett, “Re-Theorising Consumer Law” (2018) 77 Cambridge Law Journal 179-210.  
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the impact this has on a consumer’s ability to discharge the burden of proof, increase the need 
to impose some ‘network’ liability, involving re-allocation of responsibilities to traders (e.g. 
internet platforms) who would not be responsible under traditional legal regimes. 
This analysis is significant in providing specific doctrinal solutions for an important and 
emerging sector of the consumer economy. More generally, it provides a new theoretical 
framework for analysing how consumer law should deal with the challenges of innovation. 
According to this framework, legal rules should of course be developed at least partly by 
reference to the underpinning values that are appropriate for new technological and market 
conditions. However, in deciding on what these values should be, we should not 
underestimate perennial traditional risks and consumer vulnerabilities and the scope for these 
risks and vulnerabilities to be exacerbated by the new conditions. Equally, we should not 
overestimate the threats to innovation of a strongly protective ethic.   
 
2. Jurisdictional focus and significance 
The article uses UK law to make the above arguments: as to current values, why these should 
continue to underpin legal doctrine, and what this means in terms of doctrinal responses to 
3D-printing. However, the significance of the analysis goes well beyond UK law: many aspects 
of UK law on consumer goods are based on EU law (and this approach to regulating consumer 
goods is typical in many non-EU jurisdictions, too),3 so the arguments made here as to values 
and legal doctrine are of much wider international application and significance (and of course 
3D-printing plays an increasingly important role across the world4). In the development of 
consumer law, a comparative approach has always played an important role, and our analysis 
with a primary focus on UK law will be relevant to the development of legal systems elsewhere 
as they seek to adapt their laws to the challenges of balancing consumer protection demands 
with the growth of the digital economy. 
 
3. Structure  
The remainder of this Introduction explains further the changes brought by 3D-printing; the 
questions such changes generate; and how the article will address these questions by creating 
a new theoretical framework-based around underpinning values. Part II explores these values 
(the need ethic) and discusses why they remain important in an era of digital innovation. Part 
III identifies the distinctive ways in which production and supply in the 3D printing market might 
cause safety and quality problems and how these problems can be dealt with by rules that 
continue to reflect the need ethic. In many instances, this is possible under existing laws, 
subject to clarifications and extensions; but it may also require more radical disruption to 
doctrinal tradition e.g. some form of network liability. Part IV summarises the arguments and 
                                               
3 For example, provisions based on Directive 99/44/EC (Consumer Sales Directive) are found in Part 1 of the 
Consumer Rights Act 2015, for example; while similar strict liability standards exist for example in Australia 
(Australian Consumer Law 2010, Part 3-2, Div. 1), Canada (e.g. Nova Scotia Consumer Protection Act 1989, s. 26 
and New Zealand (Consumer Guarantees Act 1993, Pt. 1). 
4 Cf. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Information Economy Report 2017 – 
Digitalization, Trade and Development, UNCTAD/IER/2017, at p.7. 
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considers how the framework developed here can be used to address the challenges posed 
for consumer law by digital innovation more generally.  
 
4. Digital disruption and 3D-printing 
The rapid rise of the digital economy is readily apparent, with many new business models 
having displaced long-established ones, and new forms of production rapidly being adopted. 
Invariably, this makes it necessary to ensure that the law does not fall behind these 
developments-that it continues to provide solutions that reflect how business is done, who 
does it and what (goods, services, digital content or whatever else) is the subject of this 
business.  First there was on-line selling, initially just another way for large businesses to sell 
goods; followed by the development of on-line platforms like eBay which opened the market 
more for small business and individual sellers. These developments raised questions about 
whether there was an appropriate legal framework in place to ensure adequate consumer 
protection. In many jurisdictions, legal reforms were made to address the potential pitfalls of 
the on-line environment, e.g. ensuring that electronic contracts were legally enforceable,5 and 
that consumers were protected through information duties and cancellation rights (cooling-off 
periods).6 Platforms such as eBay in particular prompted discussion as to the effectiveness of 
the rules for determining when private individuals are treated as business sellers and therefore 
responsible for the quality of goods they supply.7  
3D-printing further disrupts pre-existing business models, bringing with it potentially quite 
radical changes to production and distribution of goods and the role played by digital content. 
The term “3D-printing” is a popular short-hand for a manufacturing process known as “additive 
manufacturing” or “additive layer manufacturing”.8 It has been compared to the familiar idea 
of printing a document, because some additive manufacturing processes utilise technology 
which is very similar to traditional document printing. However, there are several different 
technological processes grouped together under this heading, with the common feature being 
that any item to be made is created by being built-up in very thin layers, with one layer added 
to layers already “printed”. In order to make an item using an additive manufacturing process, 
its design is therefore divided into very thin layers so it can be created using a “3D-printer”.9  
There are common features to all of these processes.10 First, the item to be printed is designed 
on a computer and all its specifications and instructions for 3D-printing it are contained in a 
data file created using computer-aided-design software. This “CAD-file”, or “visual modelling 
                                               
5 E.g., Art.9(1) of the E-Commerce Directive (2000/31/EC) (not expressly transposed into UK Law).  
6 E.g., the Consumer Protection (Distance Selling) Regulations 2002, S.I. 2000/2334 (since replaced by the 
Consumer Contracts (Information, Cancellation and Additional Charges) Regulations 2013, S.I. 2013/3134). 
7 Morgan-Taylor/Willett, “The Quality Obligation and Online Marketplaces” (2005) Journal of Contract Law 155.  
8 Twigg-Flesner, “Conformity of 3D prints – Can current Sales Law cope?” in: Schulze/Staudenmeyer (eds), Digital 
Revolution – Challenges for Contract Law (Nomos, 2016). 
9 For an explanation of various methods and applications (types of material and end-product), see Barnatt, 3D 
Printing (Explaining the Future.Com, 2nd edn. 2014), ch.2. 
10 Cf. Berkowitz, “Strict Liability for Individuals? The impact of 3-D printing on Products Liability Law” (2014) 92 
Washington University Law Review 1019, 1023-1027. 
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file”11 holds all the information about the item to be printed so a 3D-printer can produce a 
tangible item. Secondly, a 3D-printer interprets the CAD-file to make the physical item. 3D-
printing technologies have thus far been primarily used in an industrial or commercial setting, 
although basic 3D-printers are already available on the consumer market.12 Finally, there is 
the material (or materials) in which the item is to be printed. Various materials can be utilised, 
particularly plastic and certain metals. Some advanced 3D-printers can make items using 
more than one type of material. 
This technology is already well-established in an industrial setting, e.g. for prototyping or for 
manufacturing customised components.13 It is rapidly entering the manufacturing mainstream 
for mass production of consumer goods because of its economical use of raw materials. 
UNCTAD recently suggested that 3D-printing would have a significant impact on production 
and trade patterns.14 It could reduce the need for international carriage of goods from the 
country of manufacture by establishing regional or local 3D-printing centres. It has been 
argued this could see the repatriation of manufacturing jobs to former industrial centres, like 
Manchester, that had lost out to developing economies.15 This would bring environmental 
benefits in that it would reduce the need for air and sea transport (although the full 
environmental implications of widespread 3D-printing have yet to be explored16).  
5. Key questions 
The impact of 3D-printing on the consumer market is most likely to be felt in how goods are 
produced and distributed and by whom; and also by the increasing role played by digital 
content in production and distribution: The issue is partly that many more goods produced by 
traditional manufacturers may be produced using 3D-printing. However, it is also likely to 
become common that instead of buying a product made by a traditional manufacturer, a 
consumer might simply buy a design (CAD) file (i.e. code) and produce a physical item on a 
home 3D-printer17 or via a commercial 3D-printing service.18 Ornaments and jewellery are 
among the early home-based 3D-printed products. As the technology develops, becomes 
more refined and commercially viable, more sophisticated home-based 3D-printers will enter 
the consumer market, allowing consumers to design and print more sophisticated products. 
So we have a transfer of the production process from traditional manufacturers both to 
individual consumers (especially ‘tech savvy’ ‘hobbyists’) and to 3D-printing services (a 
                                               
11 The term used in the European Commission’s proposal for a directive on certain aspects concerning the supply 
of digital content (COM (2015) 634 final) – see Recital 16. 
12 One of the consumer discount retailers has offered a 3D-printer as a “special buy” in 2018, for example.  
13 Sculpteo, The State of 3D Printing (Sculpteo, 2017), p.19, fns strong growth in the market 
14  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Information Economy Report 2017 – 
Digitalization, Trade and Development, UNCTAD/IER/2017, at p.7. 
15 Anderson, Makers: The New Industrial Revolution (Random House, 2013). 
16 Cf. Lin, “Herding Cats: Governing Distributed Information” (2018) 96 North Carolina Law Review 945. 
17 On 3D-printing as a modern version of cottage industries, see Anderson, Makers – The new Industrial Revolution 
(Random House, 2013).  
18 These have started to spring up in many towns already. 
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‘democratisation’ of production 19 ). Indeed, individual consumers (especially ‘tech savvy’ 
‘hobbyists’) may not only become producers of final products, they may also increasingly 
become producers (designers) of digital content-the CAD files. There are already online 
platforms where individuals can offer their designs for sale, and these platforms also offer the 
possibility of having more complex designs printed on an industrial 3D-printer.20 
It is clear that 3D-printing may bring radical changes to the consumer market: new modes of 
production, new consumer (‘prosumer’) (and other) producers, and a more significant role for 
digital content.  The transition of the traditional roles of consumer and trader, which the 
consumer’s role confined to that of a recipient of goods and services, has for some time been 
less clear-cut as individuals have increasingly been involved in making and/or supplying goods 
and services.21 The possibilities created by 3D-printing will further blur the boundaries. This 
raises the question whether this will require a fundamental shift in the legal regime. For 
example, should the goods produced be subject to the same or different standards as 
traditionally produced goods? What responsibility should there be for the quality and safety of 
digital content? Will the proliferation of hobby producers and sellers lead to liability gaps (with 
such parties not meeting traditional ‘business’ activity criteria to be held responsible under 
strict liability standards)? If so, should liability be transferred elsewhere in the production and 
supply network-to businesses that would not be liable under traditional contract or tort rules?  
One way to address these questions is to focus on staying as faithful as possible to existing 
laws. This might involve clarifying the scope of such existing laws (e.g. clarifying when 
hobbyists become business suppliers and thereby undertake responsibilities under existing 
strict liability rules 22 ). It might also involve extending existing rules. However, under an 
approach prioritising faithfulness to doctrinal tradition, responsibilities should only be extended 
to the sorts of parties that would be responsible for something analogous under traditional 
legal principles, e.g. making contractual suppliers strictly liable not only (as currently) for poor 
quality goods, but also (by analogy) for poor quality digital content.23 However if a party would 
not be responsible even for something analogous under traditional laws, they should not be 
made liable under an extension. For example, if an internet platform does not produce goods 
or digital content, they are not currently liable in tort for safety problems; and if they do not 
contractually supply them they are not liable in contract for quality problems.24 Faithfulness to 
                                               
19 Howells/Willett, “3D Printing: The Limits of Contract and Challenges for tort” in R. Schulze and D. Staudenmayer 
(eds)  Digital Revolution: Challenges for Contact Law in Practice (Nomos, 2016) 
20 Designers may also share their CAD-files and allow others to modify these, this raising legal issues beyond the 
scope of this paper: see e.g., A Daly, Socio Legal Aspects of the 3D Printing Revolution (Palgrave-Macmillan, 
London, 2016). 
21 For an overview, see Ritzer/Dean/Jurgenson, “The Coming of Age of the Prosumer” (2012) 56 American 
Behavioral Scientist 379; also, Jacobs, “The Energy Prosumer” (2016) 43 Ecology Law Quarterly 519. 
22 See infra at Part II on these strict liability rules. 
23 CRA, Part I, ch. 3; Willett, “Re-Theorising Consumer Law”, supra, fn 00, 191-4; and infra, Part III. 
24 Infra, Part III. 
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doctrinal tradition therefore dictates that the law should not be changed to make them liable 
for such problems.25  
Rather than placing such emphasis on staying true to existing law, one might focus on values: 
What should the technological changes mean for the underpinning values of consumer law 
and what, in turn, should this mean for legal rules and principles? The key difference from the 
doctrinally centred approach is that under the values driven approach, we are prepared to 
deviate from doctrinal tradition if it is necessary to reflect the underpinning values considered 
to be appropriate.  
The term “values” here connotes ideas about the contextual motivations behind the level of 
consumer protection: in particular, how concerned (or not) one should be as to the risks facing 
consumers; how much or little one should focus on consumer vulnerabilities (in information 
processing, bargaining strength, loss bearing abilities, etc.).  To put it slightly differently, 
“values” reflect the extent to which the law should prioritise consumer need, business self-
interest, consumer self-reliance etc.26 A values-driven approach recognises that legal rules do 
not exist in a vacuum. They are at least partly shaped by underpinning values, which exist for 
good reasons. For example, the need ethic (explained in full at Part II below) is based on a 
view as to consumer vulnerability to economic and social detriment;27 so not insisting on legal 
rules that reflect this need ethic may increase such detriment. Of course, even if continuing to 
adhere to important underpinning values in times of technological change may suggest a 
possible need for doctrinal changes, but this is not to say that there cannot still be a pause for 
reflection in order to balance the importance of the underpinning values with the advantages 
(e.g. as to certainty and continuity) that may come with sticking to doctrinal tradition. The point 
however is that, having examined issues from a values-driven perspective (rather than 
focusing purely on doctrinal tradition), we are at least aware of the policy choices that need to 
be made.  
For these reasons, this paper follows a values-driven approach. The argument made below is 
that the law on consumer goods 28  is currently based on the need ethic. Despite the 
suggestions that consumers are significantly empowered to cope with the risks of new 
technology it is then shown that there is a strong case for adherence to the values of the need 
                                               
25 Adherence to doctrinal tradition could be seen as congruent with ‘coherentism’, which seeks to preserve doctrinal 
coherence and its application to new circumstances (e.g., Brownsword, “After Brexit: Regulatory-instrumentalism, 
Coherentism and the English Law of Contract” (2017) 34 Journal of Contract Law 139-164, esp. pp.142-3, 
developing the work of Rubin, “From Coherence to Effectiveness” in van Gestel/Micklitz/Rubin (eds.) Rethinking 
Legal Scholarship (Cambridge University Press, 2017)). But in the present paper the approach being described is 
one where emphasis is on (i) consistency with existing doctrine (whether that doctrine is ‘coherent’ or not), and (ii) 
doctrine (coherentism might also be understood to cover coherence in values and in this way overlap with the 
values driven approach which the present paper actually offers as an alternative to an approach that prioritises the 
maintenance of consistency with traditional doctrine).  
26  Willett “Re-Theorising Consumer Law”, supra, fn 00. This approach could be associated with so-called 
‘regulatory-instrumentalism’ which prioritises the implementation of policy goals (Brownsword, “After Brexit”, supra, 
fn 00). However, the present paper focuses on deeper values which are not always made explicit by 
States/Regulators in setting out their policy objectives. 
27 Willett “Re-Theorising Consumer Law”, supra, fn 00. 
28 I.e. contract, tort and product safety rules applicable to the goods, services or digital content that may play a role 
in the 3D-printing market.  
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ethic. It is wrong to underestimate perennial risks and consumer vulnerabilities and to ignore 
the possibility that these risks and vulnerabilities will be exacerbated by the new conditions. 
The risks are at least as high as before, consumer vulnerabilities are at least as significant, 
and the threats to innovation of a strongly protective ethic should not be overstated. 
It is then shown that, despite the innovations brought by 3D-printing, the law can often continue 
to reflect the need ethic through clarifications and modest extensions; but on occasion it will 
need to deviate from doctrinal tradition e.g. by imposing liability for quality or safety problems 
on supply network members who would not be liable for this, or anything analogous to this, 
under traditional laws.  
 
6. Filling key research gaps-a new way of responding to innovation 
Previous legal literature has barely begun to address these questions. Much of the work on 
3D-printing has concentrated on the intellectual property implications, 29  concerns about 
workplace protection, environmental risks, and safety,30 and there has been US and Australian 
work on the use of 3D-printing to make inherently dangerous or prohibited items, especially 
guns. 31  There has been some work on some of the rules we focus on here: tentative 
discussions of the product liability implications if 3D-printed goods cause harm,32 and of some 
specific questions that arise in contract and tort law in relation to 3D-printing.33 However, this 
prior work does not adopt a methodical approach like ours that considers the relationship 
between 3D-printing, legal rules and principles, and underpinning consumer protection values.  
The general scholarship on law and technology certainly includes important work on the 
relationship between new technologies and values such as liberty, equality and democracy.34 
Even in consumer law more specifically, in debates about artificial intelligence and reliance on 
recommendations made by digital assistants, there have been attempts to determine the role 
of underlying values such as autonomy and freedom of choice.35 However, as will be explained 
further below (Part II), recent work has shown that labels such as autonomy and freedom are 
of limited help in understanding consumer law values. Essentially they are too indeterminate. 
Rather than focusing on the traditional framework that contrasts freedom/autonomy with 
                                               
29 See, e.g., Desai/Magliocca, “Patents, Meet Napster: 3D Printing and the Digitisation of Things” (2014) 102 
Georgetown Law Journal, 1691. 
30 Kennedy/Giampetro-Meyer, “Gearing Up for the Next Industrial Revolution: 3D Printing, Home-Based Factories, 
and Modes of Social Control” (2014) 45 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal 955. 
31 See e.g., Curtis, “A Wiki Weapon Solution: Firearm Regulation for the Management of 3D Printing in the 
American Household” (2015) 41 Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal 74.  
32 Berkowitz, “Strict Liability for Individuals? The impact of 3-D printing on Products Liability Law” (2014) 92 
Washington University Law Review 1019 (U.S.) and Nielsen/Griggs, “Allocating Risks and Liability for 3D printed 
products: product safety, negligence, or something new?” (2016) 42 Monash L.R. 712 (Australia).  
33 Osborn, ‘Regulating Three-Dimensional Printing: The Converging World of Bits and Atoms’ (2014) 51 San Diego 
Law Review 553; Twigg-Flesner, “Conformity of 3D prints – Can current Sales Law cope?” and Howells/Willett, “3D 
Printing: The Limits of Contract and Challenges for Tort”, both in: Schulze/Staudenmeyer (eds), Digital Revolution 
– Challenges for Contract Law (Nomos, 2016). 
34 See generally Brownsword/Scotford/Yeung (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Law, Regulation and Technology 
(Oxford University Press, 2017). 
35 Helbing/Frey/Gigerenzer/Hafen/Hagner/Hofstetter/van den Hoven/Zicari/Zwitter, “Will Democracy Survive Big 
Data and Artificial Intelligence?”, Scientific American, February 25, 2017. 
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‘fairness’, it is more instructive to contrast competing ethics of ‘need’ and ‘business self-
interest/consumer self-reliance’. 36  However, even this prior work on need versus self-
interest/reliance was focussed simply on how consumer law can and should be explained in 
terms of underpinning values; rather than with using such underpinning values to look forward-
to help determine how law should react to innovation. This current paper is the first to take this 
step: to use the need ethic (as a key underpinning value in consumer law) as part of an 
approach to charting how legal doctrine should respond to digital innovation. This is core to 
the paper’s broader purpose, to create a new theoretical framework for dealing with the 
challenges of digital innovation. This is a framework that emphasises the importance of 
underpinning values in shaping the development of doctrinal responses to innovations. 
However, this framework also stresses that in deciding whether these values should change 
in response to innovations, it is wrong to underestimate either traditional risks and consumer 
vulnerabilities or the potential for these risks and vulnerabilities to be exacerbated by the 
innovations. It is also wrong to overestimate the extent to which a strong protective ethic may 
stymie innovation.  
Not only is the paper the first to develop this general framework for how consumer law should 
respond to innovation, it also applies this approach in such a way as to provides a set of 
original doctrinal solutions to the distinctive quality and safety issues that arise in the 3D-
printing market.   
     
II. Consumer Law Values and Digital Innovation  
This Part considers the values which underpin the area of consumer law affected by 3D-
printing and why these values remain important in an era of digital innovation.  
 
1. The need ethic  
Ultimately 3D-printing produces goods, so, to identify the relevant underlying values, we must 
consider the existing legal rules applicable to goods. These rules can be said to be rooted at 
least to a significant degree in a ‘need-oriented’ ethic, 37  which recognises consumer 
vulnerabilities. To explain what is meant by this, it is first necessary to deal with two contrasting 
ethics which are often evident in legal regimes. Thus, Consumer law can be explained in terms 
of a tension between rules based on a need ethic (emphasising protecting consumers from 
their vulnerabilities); and rules based on an ethic that emphasises both business self-interest 
(e.g. to maximise their profits, minimise their responsibilities) and consumer self-reliance (e.g. 
to protect their interests by informing themselves of risks and negotiating better deals with the 
business).38   
                                               
36 Willett “Re-Theorising Consumer Law”, supra, fn 00.  
37 Willett, “Re-Theorising Consumer Law”, supra, fn 00; Wilhemsson, Critical Studies in Private Law - A Treatise 
on Need-Rational Principles in Modern Law (Kluwer, 1992). 
38 Willett, “Re-Theorising Consumer Law”, supra, fn 00.  
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This ‘need versus self-interest/self-reliance’ framework is a more nuanced way to understand 
consumer law than the traditional ‘fairness versus freedom’ framework: The need ethic 
axiomatically makes it very clear that the priority is consumer ‘need’, i.e. to protect consumers 
from the consequences of their vulnerabilities. In contrast although ‘fairness’ may often be 
taken to equate with the need ethic, it is sufficiently vague that it is sometimes said to be ‘fair’ 
to favour business self-interest and consumer self-reliance. ‘Freedom’ can often be equated 
with business self-interest/consumer self-reliance. Again, however, ‘freedom’ is vague: e.g. 
one might plausibly claim that need based protections are required to replicate what 
consumers would agree to if they were ‘really’ free i.e. if they did not suffer from vulnerabilities 
preventing them from effectively negotiating to protect their interests. ‘Self-interest/reliance’ is 
clearer, the focus being specifically on trader freedom to pursue self-interest, and consumer 
freedom to exercise self-reliance. 
In relation to consumer private law rules on goods, the need ethic manifests itself typically in 
strict (or at least quasi-strict) tort liability on producers for ‘defective’ products causing injury 
or property damage;39 and strict contractual law liability on front-line suppliers as regards 
quality, fitness for purpose and compliance with description, model or sample 40.  
Strict liability means that businesses are responsible for defective outcomes (unsafe, defective, 
poor quality, etc goods), even if they exercised reasonable care in their procedures. All that 
matters is whether the goods are in a defective condition. It does not matter whether the 
business was in any way at fault in bringing about this outcome. The alternative is to have 
fault/negligence based standards, where producers and suppliers of goods would escape 
responsibility based on their procedures, i.e. based on having exercised reasonable care 
(following standard business practice) in the production, selection or supply (as the case may 
be) of the goods.41 This generally makes it harder for consumers to establish their claim: e.g. 
producers may be able to show that the defective outcome was a fluke, that their procedures 
are generally sound and had been followed in the case in question.  
It is true that the strict liability approach in tort is tempered, to an extent, by the defences 
available to a business. In particular, the producer can escape liability (under the so-called 
‘development risks’ defence) by showing that when the product was supplied: 
‘the state of scientific and technical knowledge … was not such that a producer of 
products of the same description as the product in question might be expected to have 
discovered the defect if it had existed in his products while they were under his 
control’.42 
                                               
39 Product Liability Directive (85/374/EEC), Part 1 of the Consumer Protection Act 1987 (UK). 
40 Consumer Sales Directive (99/44/EC), Art 2; Consumer Rights Act 2015, ss. 9-18. 
41 Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 2 All ER 118, Harrison v Shepherd Homes Ltd [2011] 
EWHC 1811 (TCC)  
42 Consumer Protection Act 1987, s 4 (2) (1) (e) and s. 4 (2) (based on EU Directive 85/374/EEC on product liability, 
article 7 (e)). For other defences: Consumer Protection Act 1987, s. 4/ EU Directive 85/374/EEC art 7. 
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However, this will only apply to so-called ‘design’ defects. The idea is that the supplier can 
escape legal responsibility by showing that although when the product was supplied this type 
of product was prone to flaws/risks by virtue of its basic makeup (its design); the state of 
scientific and technical knowledge was not advanced enough at that point for the producer to 
be aware of this tendency.43 The defence does not apply to the much more routine problem of 
manufacturing defects-problems (such as foreign objects entering food, or toys or car parts 
with breaks or weaknesses) that are simply caused by breakdowns in quality control during 
the manufacturing process rather than having anything to do with limited scientific and 
technical knowledge as to inherently flawed designs.44  
In addition, even in the case of design defects, there is at least ‘quasi’ strict liability. After all, 
the producer is in principle liable simply on the basis of the consumer showing that there was 
a defect-without the consumer facing the above-mentioned problems of proving 
fault/negligence. The burden of proof in establishing the development risks (or any other) 
defence lies on the producer. This may not be such an easy burden to discharge, especially 
in an age where any information as to possible design risks (that producers could arguably 
have been aware of) is more readily accessible than ever before.  
So not requiring consumers to establish negligence to make a claim against producers will 
very often make it much more likely that consumers will obtain redress. The problems of a 
negligence regime for consumers would be even greater in relation to front-line suppliers such 
as retailers who normally will have purchased the goods from a producer. Defects in goods 
usually originate in the production process, and if it is hard to show negligence by the producer, 
it is even harder with retailers. So, it would often be very difficult indeed for consumers to show 
that the retailer had not acted with reasonable care.  
These quasi-strict and fully strict liability regimes indicate an underpinning need ethic that 
recognises the relative vulnerability of the consumer. It recognises that insofar as traders 
suffer economic losses through being required to provide remedies to consumers when goods 
are defective, they are often well placed to absorb this (e.g., through insurance), or to distribute 
this among all customers (e.g. through small price rises). However, consumers, as private 
citizens, often have limited capacity to absorb economic losses caused by defective goods.45 
Also, defective goods may have a significant effect on the private life of the consumer and 
create ‘consumer surplus’ effects,46 such as the loss of time, distress, or inconvenience of 
taking action, affecting their personal lives.47  
                                               
43 Hodges, “Development Risks: Unanswered Questions” (1998) 61 M.L.R. 560; Mildred and Howells, “Comment 
on ‘Development Risks: Unanswered Questions” (1998) 61 M.L.R. 570. 
44 For authoritative judicial consideration, see A and others v National Blood Authority and another [2001] EWHC 
QB 446 (Burton J). 
45 Willett, Fairness in Consumer Contracts (Ashgate, 2007). 
46 Seminally, see Harris/Ogus/Phillips, “Contract Remedies and the Consumer Surplus” (1979) 95 Law Quarterly 
Review 581. 
47 Willett, “General Clauses and the Competing Ethics of EU Consumer Law” (2012) CLJ  412, at p. 420, and for 
recent re-affirmation of this problem, Citizens Advice and Oxford Economics, Consumer Detriment (Oxford 2016).  
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The strict and quasi-strict liability standards are also based on a need ethic in that they 
recognise that consumers often struggle to protect themselves (from these negative economic 
and consumer surplus consequences) by the exercise of self-reliance. As consumers are not 
expert, ‘repeat players’ in the business in question, they generally have limited knowledge or 
understanding of the risks of goods being defective.48 So if the law only imposed a fault-based 
standard, consumers would not think it necessary to seek to bargain for traders to provide 
express (strict liability) commitments as to quality/safety. Even if they did, the need-oriented 
view is that that they would usually not be successful: individual consumers are usually neither 
sufficiently important to traders, nor able to match traders’ bargaining sophistication and 
experience.49 This would leave consumers having to prove negligence once safety or quality 
problems arise, which is often very difficult. 
Overall then, private law strict and quasi-strict liability standards are grounded in a need ethic 
that recognises consumer vulnerabilities.50 Fault based standards are based more on the 
alternative business self-interest/consumer self-reliance ethic: businesses escape 
responsibility for defective outcomes unless consumers have managed (through self-reliant 
action) to bargain for express guarantees of good quality and safe outcomes or to establish 
negligence by the business when a dispute arises.  
2. Innovation and the continuing importance of the need ethic  
It is conceivable that the risks to consumers may actually be exacerbated in circumstances of 
3D-Printing innovation. New technical and business models bring new and less well known 
risks of failure (whether based on unknown design defects or simply inexperience in this form 
of manufacturing process): so that there may be greater risk of the resulting goods or digital 
content being of poor quality, or even unsafe. There is the general risk posed by making 
increasing numbers of consumer products using a relatively new form of technology. There 
may also be particularly risky aspects of production and supply in the 3D-printing market. 3D-
printing may prompt a shift from the purchased of physical items to the purchase of a CAD-
file which allows a physical item to be 3D-printed, either by a commercial printer or by a 
consumer with a home 3D-printer. There may be a high risk of defective products emerging if 
the platforms and shops using these commercial printers are not experienced producers, with 
special expertise in the code, printer, physical materials or the overall process; and these 
                                               
48  For recent support from behavioural economics, Esposito, “A Dismal Reality: Behavioural Analysis and 
Consumer Policy” (2017) 40 Journal of Consumer Policy 1. 
49 Brownsword, Contract Law: Themes for the Twenty-First Century (Oxford, 2006), 79-85 and Willett, Fairness in 
Consumer Contracts (Ashgate, 2007), 39-46. 
50 Some consumers may not have these vulnerabilities (e.g. being rich and able to absorb losses, exceptionally 
well informed and able at bargaining), but the strict and quasi strict standards are based on a (need-oriented) view 
that the majority are indeed vulnerable relative to traders. Some consumers will be even more vulnerable than 
average, which is not given recognition in these generally applicable standards but is in other parts of consumer 
law especially unfair commercial practices: on this and the complexities of consumer vulnerability generally Reich, 
“Vulnerable Consumers in EU Law” in: Leczykiewicz/Weatherill, The Images of the Consumer in EU Law (Hart, 
2016)). Strict liability standards are also imposed in business to business sales (Sale of Goods Act 1979, ss. 12-
15), but these can be excluded/limited subject to a test of reasonableness (UCTA, ss. 6-7), the non-excludability 
in business to consumer contracts (CRA, s.31) emphasising the underpinning need ethic 
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problems are perhaps even more likely in the case of home printer users. The risks may also 
be increased by the inexperience of hobbyist consumer producers, who write the occasional 
CAD file code and supply it to others to print at home or via a platform or shop. Such producers 
(not being traditional professionals) will often lack the skill and experience needed to identify 
potential quality or safety shortcomings in their designs.51 
So, it appears that the risk of poor quality and unsafe goods will increase with 3D-printing. 
This reinforces the importance of the need ethic as an underpinning value.  This ethic is based 
partly on the perception that consumers are vulnerable as loss bearers. There is no reason to 
suppose that they are any more able to absorb losses caused in the 3D-printing market than 
they are in markets generally: they are no better placed to insure against economic losses, no 
less likely to suffer consumer surplus losses (distress, inconvenience etc.) when they buy 
goods produced and supplied in innovative ways such as via 3D-printing.  
The need ethic also takes consumers to be vulnerable 52  when it comes to self-reliant 
protection of their interests: and this seems likely to be just as much of a problem, and quite 
possibly more of a problem, in the 3D-printing market and the digital environment more 
generally, as it is in traditional sectors. For a start, it seems likely that consumers are relatively 
uninformed about new risks of detriment posed by these innovative technologies. Consumers 
probably do not generally consider whether goods that they buy derive from innovative 
processes such as 3D-printing or more traditional production processes pose different risks. 
They may be aware that they are using a novel process, but are likely to assume the authorities 
have equal confidence in new and old processes. In addition, as with many things marketed 
via the internet, consumer choices may be strongly steered by highly sophisticated processes 
such as behavioural advertising, cyber-butlering etc., which are likely to further reduce 
consumer reflection on quality risks.53 This may limit the competitive discipline imposed on 
suppliers, further increasing the risk of poor quality.54 In addition, if consumers are even less 
well informed and reflective than in markets generally, they are also even less likely to seek 
to bargain for express commitments from traders as to the quality and safety of what they are 
buying: so legally imposed (strict and quasi strict liability) standards are especially important. 
These points notwithstanding, it is important to ask whether innovation offers some technical 
or other solution to consumer vulnerability and/or increased risks, e.g. some way of improving 
consumer risk assessment capabilities.55 It has been argued that the internet has facilitated 
                                               
51 See infra on responding to these increased risks by clarifying who is a business supplier and by re-allocating 
responsibility within the production and supply network. 
52 The notion of “vulnerability” is much-discussed in the consumer law literature. For a useful overview of different 
types of vulnerability, see e.g., Cartwright, “Understanding and Protecting Vulnerable Financial Consumers” (2015) 
38 Journal of Consumer Policy 119. 
53 Brownsword, “The E-Commerce Directive, Consumer Transactions, and the Digital Single Market: Questions of 
Regulatory Fitness, Regulatory Disconnection and Rule Redirection” in: Grundmann (ed.), European Contract Law 
in the Digital Age (Intersentia, 2018). 
54 Also, on strict liability improving competition by providing a clearer standard: Grundman, “The Fault Principle as 
the chameleon of Contract Law: A Market Function Approach” (2009) Michigan Law Review, 1583-1599. 
55 For the potential of artificial intelligence in empowering consumers, see Contissa/Lagioia/Lippi/Micklitz/Palka/ 
Sartor/Torroni, “Towards Consumer-Empowering Artificial Intelligence” in Proceedings of the Twenty-Seventh 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3283181 
13 
 
entrance to the market of many more suppliers and that this generally improves competition 
and quality.56 It is also claimed that the new sources of information and reputational feedback 
mechanisms in internet markets better inform consumers,57 which improves informed choice 
(e.g. as to risks of poor quality and unsafe products) and in turn improves competition and 
quality.58 The argument then might be that, as much of the digital content and goods in the 
digital world, including in the 3D-printing market, are probably bought on the internet, there is 
less need for an underpinning need ethic (for strict and quasi strict liability standards). 
Customer feedback sites provide a continuous stream of reviews and critique of goods and 
digital content by consumers, which helps to inform other consumers about the likely quality 
of products. This influences consumers to buy from those with the better reputations, which 
imposes competitive pressure on all producers and suppliers to improve their quality and 
safety and reduces the risk of poor quality and unsafe products. This could imply that there is 
less need for the law to incentivise high standards through strict and quasi strict liability: that 
a negligence standard would be sufficient. 
However, behavioural science research has demonstrated time and again that consumers are 
very limited in their ability to access, read and understand information, and that their ability to 
process information is affected by, e.g., a status-quo bias, underestimating risks, being over 
optimistic and other factors.59 There is no evidence to suggest that these problems can be 
eradicated by internet sources of information and reputational feedback.60 Indeed, there are 
particular risks associated with reputational feedback: First, consumers may be even more 
trusting and over optimistic than normal as the reputational information comes from other 
consumers. Second, the reputational feedback information may be unreliable because these 
other consumers are not experts. They do not know what to look for in terms of latent defects 
etc., but can only speak from ad hoc experience (they may have been lucky/unlucky with the 
product, not known how to use it, not had it for long enough for defects to emerge when they 
do the review or be more influenced by aesthetic and functional factors than issues of safety 
which only arise when things go wrong). Third, there may be downright corruption, e.g. where 
feedback providers have been paid to give positive reviews.61  
It appears then that in innovative markets such as 3D-printing there is just as much and 
probably more reason (than in markets generally) to adhere to the need ethic. Clearly, the 
case is even stronger where safety risks are concerned. However, there is a final question to 
                                               
International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence 5150 [available at 
https://www.ijcai.org/proceedings/2018/0714.pdf (accessed 14 August 2018)]. 
56 Koopman/Mitchell/Thierer, “The Sharing Economy and Consumer Protection Regulation – The Case for Policy 
Change?” (2014-15) 8 Journal of Business Entrepreneurship and Law 529.  
57 Cf. Busch, “Crowdsourcing Consumer Confidence: How to Regulate Online Rating and Review Systems in the 
Collaborative Economy” in: De Franceschi (ed), European Contract Law and the Digital Single Market (Intersentia, 
2016). 
58 Although fn cautionary views: Malbon, “Taking Fake Online Consumer Reviews Seriously” (2013) 36 Journal of 
Consumer Policy 139; Competition and Markets Authority (UK), Online reviews and endorsements – Report on the 
CMA’s call for information, CMA41 (June 2015). 
59 Esposito, “A Dismal Reality: Behavioural Analysis and Consumer Policy” supra, fn 00. 
60 Federal Trade Commission, The Sharing Economy, (2016), 5 on limits of reputational feedback. 
61 Competition and Markets Authority, Online reviews and endorsements – Report on the CMA’s call for information, 
CMA41 (June 2015). 
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be asked about the relationship between consumer law values and innovation: Does 
maintaining or extending protection risk obstructing an important innovation? If so, it might be 
necessary to consider a shift away from the need ethic-moving along the spectrum from strict 
and quasi strict liability to a greater role for negligence in order to facilitate technological 
developments. However, innovators have often called for deregulation e.g. it was argued that 
bio-technology industries deserved exemption from product liability laws imposing strict 
liability, 62  yet these businesses have thrived without such exemptions and consumers 
continued to have the security of the protective regime.   
There should be very strong evidence of a likely chilling effect before it is decided to lower 
standards to encourage innovation. This is especially so as the rate of innovation is more rapid 
than ever before in human history and this brings an increased risk of detriment. Given these 
factors, if the law were to lower standards in response to every innovation, not only would 
there be a very high risk of increased consumer detriment, but it would be very time and 
resource consuming for lawmakers.  The law would be in a constant and confusing state of 
flux, undermining the values of clarity and certainty that are important in consumer law. There 
does not appear to be evidence as to the chilling effect of maintaining good standards of 
protection in relation to other recent digital innovations. For example, when the law responded 
to the growth of internet selling by providing consumers with information and cancellation 
rights there is no evidence that less internet selling took place.63 In general terms, there 
appears no particular evidence that good standards of protection would have a chilling effect 
in relation to 3D-printing. However, we shall return and review the risks of this in relation to 
the specific legal issues that we identify as arising and the responses that we suggest as 
desirable (Part III below).  
So, the broad conclusion for now is that notwithstanding technological innovations in the 
consumer market (such as 3D-printing), there remains a good case for adherence to the need 
ethic: risks are as high as before (or higher), consumer vulnerabilities are as significant (or 
more so) than before, and there is no obvious countervailing case based on the risk to 
innovation posed by traditional forms of consumer protection. The next part will consider how 
the law can adapt to the distinctive features of the 3D-printing market while staying true to the 
need ethic.   
III. 3D Printing and the Law 
In this part, we highlight the particular quality and safety issues that might arise in the context 
of 3D-printing, the legal questions that are raised, 64 and how the law can respond while 
continuing to reflect the need ethic. We will argue that for many aspects, this can be achieved 
                                               
62  See e.g., Traynor/Cunningham “Emerging Product Liability Issues in Biotechnology” (1988) 3 Berkeley 
Technology Law Journal 149; Fox/Traynor, “Biotechnology for Human Life and Health – The Special Case for a 
negligence-only rule to promote critical innovation” (1991) 6 High Tech L.J. 1. 
63 Cf. Bowsher, “Online retail sales continue to soar”, Financial Times, 18 January 2018. 
64 See also Osborn, “Regulating Three-Dimensional Printing: The Converging World of Bits and Atoms” (2014) 51 
San Diego Law Review 553, 558-562; Twigg-Flesner, “Conformity of 3D prints – Can current Sales Law cope?” 
supra, fn 00. 
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by applying existing legal rules, albeit with - fairly moderate - clarifications and extensions for 
some of them. However, some aspects of 3D-printing would put existing laws under heavy 
strain, and a more radical step will be needed, e.g., by introducing a form of network liability 
(discussed below). 
Several new business models have developed which utilise the specific features of the 3D-
printing technique outlined earlier. There are two stages to the 3D-printing process: first, the 
item to be printed has to be designed using suitable software and a CAD-file will be created. 
Secondly, the CAD-file will be used to instruct a 3D-printer to convert the code contained in 
the CAD-file into the physical item. Where the overall manufacturing process is fully integrated, 
all the stages from conception to design to production will be under the control of one entity, 
but the distinct nature of the design stage and the production/printing stage makes it possible 
to separate these into discrete events. Thus, anybody who has suitable software can use this 
to design a new item by creating a CAD-file. This could be done a professional designer, by 
an individual doing this at home in their spare time (i.e., a “hobbyist”), or even in a shared 
manner via open-source platforms where multiple people (whether professionals or hobbyists) 
can contribute to creating and improving a design contained in a CAD-file. Such a CAD-file 
can then be made available for purchase (either in return for payment of money or some other 
consideration) or simply shared for free – the digital nature of the CAD-file, and the internet, 
make this an extremely easy process. A consumer can therefore acquire a CAD-file in multiple 
ways, and it will not always be obvious who the author(s) of the CAD-file is (are). The second 
stage is the conversion of the CAD-file into a physical item. A consumer who has a CAD-file 
could make the physical item on a personal desktop 3D-printer (whether belonging to that 
consumer or another private individual). Alternatively, the CAD-file could be taken to a 
professional 3D-printing service which will then use the CAD-file to make the physical item. 
There are already on-line platforms which allow consumers both to offer their designs for sale 
and to upload their own or another’s CAD-file and then to order the physical item.65  
So what quality and safety problems might arise in the 3D-printing market and how can these 
problems be addressed while adhering to underpinning values i.e. the need ethic, whether 
through modest clarifications or extensions, or more significant deviations from doctrinal 
tradition. There are five particular issues to consider: (i) the use of 3D printing in the 
commercial production of goods; (ii) the potential liability of commercial operators who produce 
a printed item based on a CAD-file; (iii) the basis for liability for problems with the CAD-file and 
the design it contains; (iv) the blurred boundary between commercial and non-commercial 
(“hobbyist”) operators; and (v) whether some of the potential liability gaps created by the very 
significant role played by hobbyists in this market merit the introduction of some form of 
network liability.  
What will emerge in the analysis to follow is that adherence to the need ethic simply requires 
continuing with existing legal rules in cases (i) and (ii); and modest extensions/clarifications to 
existing rules in cases (iii) and (iv). In contrast, the suggestion that continuing to follow a need 
                                               
65 For a useful survey of the various types of platform, see Rayna/Striukova, “A Taxonomy of Online 3D Printing 
Platforms” in: van den Berg/van der Hof/Kosta, 3D Printing - Legal, Philosophical and Economic Dimensions 
(Springer, 2016), ch.9.  
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ethic might require adopting a form network liability (case (v)) can be considered a more 
radical deviation from doctrinal tradition.   
 
1. 3D printing used in commercial production of goods 
Goods which a consumer obtains at the point of retail will increasingly be commercially 
manufactured using a 3D printer, either because this technology is integrated into the 
manufacturing process, or because 3D printing technology is utilised to decentralise 
production to regional or local 3D-printing facilities. A company might, for instance, prefer to 
print on demand at several locations rather than have a central production and distribution 
centre.66 It will also allow for the personalisation for goods. As already argued above, a need 
based ethic currently underpins the law dealing with goods manufactured by traditional means, 
and the same rules apply to goods manufactured using 3D-printing technology.   
The business that supplies the goods under a contract to the consumer will be liable for any 
non-conformity under current (strict liability) rules of sales law: these rules apply to goods no 
matter what forms of technology were used to produce them.67 Also as with any sale of goods, 
these strict liability standards will apply regardless of whether the flaw originally results from 
the CAD design file, materials used or manner of printing: the focus of rules is on the final 
condition of the goods supplied to the consumer, it being no excuse that the source of the 
defect is something that the final supplier had no control over.68  
Traditional (need based) strict liability tort standards will also apply to producers who do not 
supply 3D-printed goods directly to the consumer under a supply contract.69 This may be 
important where either the consumer who bought from the seller cannot make a claim based 
on the strict liability contractual standards against the seller because the seller is insolvent; or 
where the party affected by the defect cannot use the strict liability contractual standards 
because they did not actually buy the goods under a contract of sale with the seller (perhaps 
they acquired it as a gift or were simply affected by it e.g. family members injured by defective 
brakes-made by 3D-printing in car bought by father or mother).70 The producer of a defective 
item made by a 3D-printer will be liable (to pay damages) in the normal way under the strict 
(tort) product liability regime where the product contains a ‘defect’ which causes injury or 
damage to property.71 Similarly to the strict liability standards in contract law, the producer 
does not escape liability just because the defect was caused by something supplied to the 
producer by another party such as a defective CAD design file or defective materials, which 
the producer had no reason to know were defective: the producer has nevertheless produced 
                                               
66 In the international commercial context, see Greenbaum/Gelbart/Sheinberg, “Digital Delivery of Physical Goods 
Shipping in the 3D Printing Era – Problems and Solutions” (2017) 41 Tulane Maritime Law Journal 39. 
67 I.e., Part 1 of the Consumer Rights Act 2015. There is a statutory remedy package involving a short term (usually 
30 day) right to reject and obtain a refund; a choice of repair or replacement; and if (for various reasons set out in 
the provisions) repair or replacement do not work out, the possibility of price reduction or final rejection (Consumer 
Rights Act, ss.19-24). The common law right to claim damages is also preserved ((Consumer Rights Act, s.19(9)-
(11)). 
68 Of course, the front line seller may have remedies (based on breach of the strict liability conformity standards 
from the Sale of Goods Act 1979, s. 14 against the party from whom he purchased a defective finished item.   
69 E.g., under Part I of the Consumer Protection Act 1987. 
70 Liability under the Consumer Rights Act 2015 only falls on the trader who supplied the goods to the consumer. 
71 Consumer Protection Act 1987, s.2. 
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and distributed a defective product which has caused loss or injury.72 Of course in such 
circumstances the producer may have recourse against their supplier.73  
The strict product liability regime also already makes it clear that any component parts can 
give rise to liability in their own right and this would apply to 3D printed component products.74 
It is possible that 3D printers will be used to personalise products by modifying them or adding 
accessories. In this context, product liability law in both negligence and strict liability probably 
imposes a duty on the producer to check the accessory market and give advice as regards 
the compatibility and safety of known add-on or modifications.75 
Such strict liability standards in contract and tort reflect pre-existing values i.e. the need ethic, 
there being no case to adapt to a fault based standard simply because 3D-printing has been 
used in the production process: There is the same need based case for strict liability. 
Consumers have the same limited abilities to bear losses as with products generally, the same 
limited ability to exercise self-reliance to protect against such losses (e.g. by negotiating 
express guarantees pre-contractually); and the actual risks of defects are just as high as with 
any other product, indeed possibly higher given the new nature of the technology.76 Indeed a 
consumer who buys a finished item in-store or on-line will often not even know how the item 
was produced, so they are unlikely to be aware of this increased risk. 
However, there are two further points to consider here. First, are there special market 
conditions that render protection otiose? So, is there any particular evidence in the 3D-printing 
market that consumers can be alternatively protected, e.g. that there is particularly strong 
reputational signalling in relation to 3D-printed goods, which enables consumers to make more 
informed choices over the quality that can be expected from different businesses?77 There 
does not appear to be any such evidence. Second, we must consider whether there is strong 
evidence that a strict liability approach would have a chilling effect on innovation. There does 
not appear to be any such evidence here. 3D-printing is being used increasingly widely in 
making consumer goods (62% of consumer goods, according to a recent survey),78 with 22% 
of goods produced using that technology. Statistics suggest that the use of 3D-printing for 
consumer goods is rapidly increasing;79 and this is despite the current strict liability standards. 
 
                                               
72 Consumer Protection Act 1987, s.2(2). 
73 See supra, fn 00, on the criteria. Also although consumers may also have a remedy against such parties under 
negligence law, this might be complicated to establish and in practice the problems are circumvented by channelling 
strict liability to the producer or seller. See Freeman, “The liability of inventors and designers to consumers injured 
by defective product design” (1997) 5 Consum. L.J. 65. 
74 Cf. sections 1(2) and 1(3) of the Consumer Protection Act 1987. Such component producers have special 
defences if the defect in the final product resulted from their following instructions of the final producer, or from the 
way the final producer incorporated the components: e.g., section 4(1)(f) of the Consumer Protection Act 1987 
(following Article 7(f) of the Product Liability Directive (85/374/EEC) 
75 Examples from the construction law field: Independent Broadcasting Authority v EMI Electronics and BICC 
(1980) 14 Build LR 1; Investors in Industry Commercial Properties Ltd v South Bedfordshire District Council [1986] 
1 All ER 787; Goldswain and another v Beltec Ltd (t/a BCS Consulting) [2015] EWHC 556. 
76 Supra, Part II on the need ethic, consumer vulnerabilities and new technology risks. 
77 Supra, Part II. 
78 Sculpteo, The State of 3D Printing (2017), p.24. 
79 Ibid. 
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2. Liability of professionals converting a CAD-file into a finished product.  
A new businesses model, which has emerged recently and is likely to grow considerably, is a 
professional 3D printing service, both on the High Street and online. Such services allow a 
consumer to have the physical item printed from CAD-file which they have created themselves 
or obtained from a third party.  
What exactly is the legal position in such cases? In the past, the supply of goods in which 
there was a major service element gave rise to debates in the UK as to whether the contract 
was a contract for the supply of goods or work and materials.80 However, since the 1980s 
even where the contract was one for work and materials, it has seemed fairly clear that goods 
which eventually emerged from the process had to satisfy the strict liability standards as to 
satisfactory quality and fitness for purpose.81 The Consumer Rights Act 2015 has clarified the 
law with regard to consumer transactions, and now provides that that a contract will be one of 
sale (in which these strict liability standards will apply82) where “goods are to be manufactured 
or produced and the trader agrees to supply them to the consumer”.83 It is arguable that this 
would cover the production of a product by a commercial 3D-printing service. This extended 
notion of “sale” is based on the Consumer Sales Directive (99/44/EC),84 although this absolves 
a seller from liability for non-conformity where “the lack of conformity has its origin in materials 
supplied by the consumer”.85 However, there is no such qualification in UK Law, and so the 
fact that the consumer supplied the CAD-file which the 3D-printing service has turned into the 
finished product would not affect its liability towards the consumer for the quality and fitness 
for purpose of those goods. 
This (need based) strict liability solution appears entirely appropriate. From the consumer’s 
perspective, the situation does not differ a great deal from the purchase of an already 
manufactured item, and so the same need-ethic seems appropriate in the case of these 3D-
printing services. Consumer vulnerabilities to defective outcomes remain the same for these 
as any other products and there appear to be no greater prospects for consumer self-reliant 
protection than in other contexts. So the case appears to present itself for a continuation of 
the need based (strict liability) approach. Further there is no evidence that the market solves 
problems via especially fierce competition between businesses offering this sort of service, 
backed by especially strong reputational signalling.  
It might be argued that there is a risk of chilling innovation by maintaining strict liability in this 
context where these 3D printing service providers may not engage in mass production (as 
often is the case with goods generally), so that there is less scope to internalise costs. 
However, though each product is made individually to order, there can be many orders for 
some particular products and the 3D-printing process itself will be a regular activity for the 
business. Moreover, small scale production should not be a reason for accepting a lower level 
                                               
80 See Lee v Griffin, (1861) 1 B and S 272, Robinson v Graves [1935] 1 KB 579 and Watson v Buckley Osborne & 
Co [1940] 1 All ER 174. 
81 Then under the Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982. 
82 Consumer Rights Act 2015, ss. 9-15 
83 Section 5(2)(a) Consumer Rights Act 2015. 
84 Cf. Art. 1(4) Consumer Sales Directive (99/44/EC). 
85 Article 2(3) Consumer Sales Directive (99/44/EC). 
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of consumer protection. There is no evidence that liability is having a chilling effect on the 
development of the 3D printing industry and we should be slow to accede to such arguments 
as they are easily made, but hard to prove and run counter to the rationales for protection.  
Another possible reason that strict liability here might be said to risk chilling innovation is that 
a large element of what is being provided is a service and traditionally legal policy has been 
reluctant to impose strict liability for services because the outcome often cannot be predicted 
with certainty.86 However, while this is the case with services such as medical treatment, there 
would seem to be fewer reasons to object to strict liability where the only task is to properly 
follow the instructions on the CAD file and use correct materials and processing procedures. 
This may be particularly true when the final product can be checked. There might be a concern 
that a strict liability approach would overburden the printing service provider in that it means 
that the provider is liable not only for errors within the printing process but also becomes the 
guarantor of the design of the product as found in the CAD (in the sense that they are liable 
for the final printed product even if the cause of the defect was a faulty design code). It might 
be considered harsh (and potentially to chill innovation by discouraging businesses from 
offering this sort of service) to impose liability on a printing service for defects that have their 
origin in a CAD file acquired elsewhere by the consumer, or even written personally by them. 
Traditional producers can be expected to know the design standards for their products and to 
monitor their products and have quality control procedures in place. But in the present situation, 
the 3D-printing service simply prints according to instructions in a CAD file that the service 
provider has no past connection with. This may seem unfair, but of course is not dissimilar to 
the plight of sellers generally who may not have knowledge of the design and no ability to 
quality control products, but who are nevertheless strictly liable for their defects.87 
Indeed, the problem is probably manageable under the strict liability standards in such a way 
as to protect the trader through modification of consumer expectations. Although the 
consumer’s rights cannot be excluded using standard terms,88 if the final product has an 
obvious defect and the supplier draws this to the consumer’s attention there will be no liability 
for such non-conformity.89 Second, the core strict liability standard, the satisfactory quality 
term, turns on what a ‘reasonable person would regard as satisfactory’.90 So, if the 3D-printing 
service provider indicates to the consumer that final product to be expected is simply a product 
conforming to the CAD-file (which may not be a perfect design), this arguably modifies what 
the reasonable consumer can expect/what they would regard as satisfactory. The consumer 
wanted a product printed that conformed to the CAD-file and has been warned as to the 
possible restrictions inherent in this, and so as long as the final product does indeed conform 
                                               
86  Willett, “Re-Theorising Consumer Law”, supra, fn 00, 198-99. 
87 Whether under the Consumer Rights Act 2015, the Consumer Sales Directive (99/44/EC) or other consumer 
sales regimes (see Howells/Twigg-Flesner/Micklitz/Lei, Comparative Consumer Sales Law (Routledge, 2017)). 
88 Consumer Rights Act 2015, s. 31. 
89 Cf. s.9(4)(a) Consumer Rights Act 2015; Art.2(3) Consumer Sales Directive (99/44/EC). 
90 Cf. s. 9(2) Consumer Rights Act 2015; Art.2(2)(d) Consumer Sales Directive (99/44/EC). 
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to the CAD-file, this is arguably all that a reasonable consumer could expect/regard as 
satisfactory.91 
What of strict (tort) liability for a product that is defective in the sense of actually being unsafe? 
Where such a defect emerges from a 3D-printing service, and the party affected is the 
consumer that purchased the service/goods, then this consumer can also claim damages 
under the above (strict liability) contract law regime (unsafe goods will usually be in breach of 
the satisfactory quality standards92). However, what if the defective product has harmed a third 
party, e.g. a family member or friend of the consumer who has no contractual claim against 
the service provider?  
In such cases, the 3D-printing service would also be a producer for the purposes of the 
Consumer Protection Act 1987 (as someone who ‘makes’ goods using the code and the 
printer), and therefore liable under the strict tort product liability regime to the injured (non-
contracting) consumer.93 This would apply whether the fault derived from the printer, the 
materials used or the CAD-file. All that matters is that the final product is defective. Of course 
this also means that the liability would apply in cases where the defect derived from a defective 
CAD-file, whether or not the service supplier/producer provided or had prior knowledge of the 
CAD-file. 94  In cases where the service supplier/producer did not supply or have past 
knowledge of the CAD-file, what if the service supplier/producer has warned the consumer 
that all that can be expected in terms of safety is what is written in the CAD file-with whatever 
flaws this may contain? Although producers can modify consumer expectations of safety in 
the product liability context,95 given that the right to physical safety deserves higher protection 
than the right to quality, it seems likely that the courts would insist upon a basic threshold of 
safety in such cases and hold the supplier/producer liable for failure to meet this 
notwithstanding any warnings given based on the CAD-file.  
Above we set out the various reasons that a need-oriented ethic should continue to be followed 
to support a continued strict liability standard in relation to contract law standards. The same 
arguments apply here with adaptations to the safety context: consumer vulnerabilities to the 
losses caused by goods printed by platforms are no less than in relation to other goods;  
consumers have no greater capacity to self-protect than in other cases; the risks may be 
greater due to the new technology; we need to be particularly protective where safety interests 
are concerned; and there is no evidence that innovation makes the protection otiose or that 
innovation will be undermined by the protection.  
                                               
91 It might be argued that the trader need not even state that the final product can only be guaranteed to conform 
to the CAD-file, as the reasonable person would regard this as obvious, but a cautious trader would make the point 
clear. 
92 Safety is a factor to be taken into account in determining whether goods are of satisfactory quality: Consumer 
Rights Act, s. 9 (3) (d). 
93 It goes without saying that the regulatory consumer safety laws should apply to the final products produced, 
especially the powers to take remedial action. 
94 Where the problem derives from a CAD-file, see the recommendation infra to clarify that the CAD-file is a product, 
meaning that there would also be an action in strict tort liability against the designer of the file.  
95 Section 3(1), Consumer Protection Act 1987, requires a level of safety “as persons generally are entitled to 
expect”, and such expectations can be modified by appropriate warnings: see Worsley v Tambrands Ltd [2000] 
P.I.Q.R. P95; A v National Blood Authority [2001] 3 All ER 289; most recently: Wilkes v Depuy International Ltd 
[2016] EWHC 3096 (QB). 




3. Liability for CAD file.  
An integral element of the 3D-production process is the creation of a CAD file which contains 
the design of the physical item to be produced. In instances where a consumer simply buys a 
finished item, there is not going to be separate liability to the consumer on the designer who 
created the CAD file, because the design stage is part of the overall production process, just 
as it would be with goods produced using more traditional means. The situation starts to get 
more complicated once a consumer buys, or acquires, the CAD-file in a separate transaction, 
and then either creates the physical product on their own 3D printer, or has someone else, 
such as a professional 3D-printing service, print the product for him/her. There could be any 
of a number of problems which related to the CAD file. In particular, there could be (a) a flaw 
in the design recorded in the CAD file; or (b) a problem with the CAD file itself (e.g., because 
it has become corrupted).96  
As indicated above, where consumers contract to buy goods made by a 3D-printing process 
strict liability operates. Thus, if the defective code has caused an item printed by a professional 
3D-printing service to be defective, then as we saw above, this printing service provider will 
be strictly liable (in contract law) for defects resulting in the final goods supplied.97 However, 
as we also noted above, this provider may be able to use warnings to modify their obligation 
such that they are only responsible for the final product conforming to what is on the file. In 
such circumstances, if the file is badly designed or corrupted, and such problems are simply 
reflected in the final product, the consumer would then have no recourse against the printing 
service provider. But the consumer has now paid for defective code and also for this to be 
converted into a finished product, only to be left (because of the defective code) with a 
defective final product. So the question arises as to what recourse the consumer should have 
and does have against anyone when it comes to recovering these losses. Another possibility 
of course is that the consumer uses the defective code to print the finished item at home and 
because of the defective code, the finished item is defective. Once again, the question is 
whether the consumer should have and does indeed have recourse in contract or tort98 for the 
losses suffered.   
Arguably, it would properly reflect the need ethic for there to be strict liability in both contract 
and tort in such circumstances. When a defective file causes the printed product to be 
defective, consumers have the same limited abilities to bear losses as with any defective 
product, the same limited ability to protect against such losses through self-reliance (e.g. by 
negotiating express guarantees pre-contractually); and the risks of CAD files leading to 
                                               
96  It may be that these instances are the digital equivalent of the familiar distinction between design and 
manufacturing defects in the area of product liability: see A v National Blood Authority (No.1) [2001] 3 All E.R. 289; 
Wilkes v DePuy International Ltd [2016] EWHC 3096 (QB). Also Borra, “Products Liability in the 21st century” [2013] 
Juridical Review 199-225; Nolan, “Strict product liability for design defects” (2018) 134 L.Q.R. 176-181. 
97 See supra at X.X. 
98 As discussed above, tort may be an important route where a contractual claim is unavailable e.g. because the 
consumer buyer suffering the losses finds that the party from who they purchased the code under a contract (and 
against whom the contractual claim would lie) is now insolvent; or where the consumer suffering the losses did not 
buy the code under a contract but received it perhaps from a family member, friend or colleague,  
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defective end products are just as high as with any technology, perhaps higher given the new 
nature of the technology.  
One issue is whether a CAD-file should be treated as only providing information which is then 
translated into action by a 3D-printer: and therefore whether this situation should be treated in 
the same way as the provision of information which consumers (or others) act upon, i.e., 
subject to the law of negligence and not to strict liability.99 However, this analogy does not 
seem sound here. Where Y has relied on incorrect information provided by X, making X’s 
liability subject to proof of fault by X can be explained on the basis that Y has exercised a 
reasonably significant degree of autonomy or self-reliance: Y mentally processes the 
information, perhaps makes judgements based on at least some degree of experience or even 
intuition as to whether and to what extent to trust it, and then decides precisely how to use the 
information. This autonomous agency by Y might be said to explain why X should bear 
something less than strict responsibility for the consequences of Y’s reliance on the 
information. In contrast, there is much more limited autonomous or self-reliant agency by the 
consumer in our current scenario. The CAD-file is simply fed into the 3D-printer by the 
consumer and from this point it is the file that exercises agency: directly causing an action to 
occur by instructing the printer how to construct the materials into an end (potentially defective) 
product. On this basis it seems reasonable for the file to be treated in the same way as the 
law would treat a tangible product that is defective and (due to this defectiveness) affects 
another product i.e. to subject the file to strict liability.100 
Are there special market conditions that might make such protection otiose? So, is there any 
particular evidence in the 3D-printing market that consumers can be alternatively protected, 
e.g. that competition over code writing is especially fierce, and this is enhanced by superb 
reputational signalling of some kind?101 There does not appear to be any such evidence. 
Second, we must consider whether there is strong evidence that such an approach would 
have a chilling effect on innovation. Again there does not appear to be any such evidence 
here. There would appear to be no reasons why commercial digital content writers could not 
make the same assessments of risk as producers of goods. It is likely that some industry 
interests will argue that strict liability for code may threaten the development of an innovative 
industry. However, history shows that even more high risk and valuable sectors, such as 
biotechnology, have called for such special treatment, and not been granted it with no undue 
effects on innovation.102 
So what is needed to ensure that (need based) strict liability standards apply in contract and 
tort? In short the answer is that a degree of clarification/extension is required: which in the UK 
case has already recently occurred in the case of contract law but not in the case of tort law.  
In UK contract law, prior to the Consumer Rights Act 2015 (and still now for business to 
business transactions), the standard of quality expected from digital content was unclear. 
                                               
99 On liability for negligent misstatements see e.g, Peel, Treitel on the Law of Contract, 14th ed., (Sweet & Maxwell, 
2015), ch.9(2)(ii). 
100  Cf. Howells/Twigg-Flesner/Willett, “Product Liability and Digital Products” in 
Synodinou/Jougleux/Markou/Prastitou (ed.) EU Internet Law – Regulation and Enforcement (Springer, 2017). 
101 See supra, Part II. 
102 Burk/Bozcar, “Biotechnolgy and tort liability: A strategic industry at risk” (1995) 55 Uni Pitt L R 791. 
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There had been case-law dealing with the status of “software”, but this had not reached a clear 
position. Where the digital content was supplied on a tangible medium, i.e., goods, the digital 
content was in some instances classified as being part of those goods and therefore covered 
by the strict liability terms applicable to goods.103 However, where there was no tangible 
medium (as where a CAD file is provided electronically), it was unclear whether the contract 
was “sui generis”, containing a common law implied (strict liability) term of reasonable fitness 
for purpose;104 or a contract for services,105 in which case there would only be a statutory 
implied term of reasonable care and skill (a fault standard).106 In the latter scenario it might be 
difficult for the consumer to establish negligence by the supplier of the CAD-file, especially if 
the supplier was not the actual creator of the CAD-file (i.e., the producer), but had bought it 
from the creator and so could not typically be said to be negligent for not checking the file 
before selling it on to the consumer. If the supplier was also the producer of the CAD-file, it 
might be easier to establish negligence at least where it could be shown that the design was 
not created with sufficient care as to whether the printed product would be dangerous and 
could cause injury. However, there would not have been liability for simple quality 
shortcomings in negligence.107  
In the UK, the legal regime applicable to the contractual supply of digital content to consumers 
has now been clarified, and the strict liability conformity standards applicable to goods have 
been extended to digital content. The Consumer Right Act 2015 has a specific chapter on the 
supply of digital content.108 This imposes strict liability obligations analogous to those for 
goods, i.e. supplying digital content of satisfactory quality and fit for any particular purpose 
made known.109 This means that the supplier of a defective CAD file will be liable to the 
consumer buying the file without the need for the consumer to prove any fault on the part of 
the supplier. This liability would cover defects deriving from design flaws or from technical 
flaws with the CAD file.110 
These provisions only apply where the digital content was supplied in return for the payment 
of a price,111 so they would not apply where the digital content was acquired for free, or in 
return for providing data to the supplier. Similar remedies apply to digital content under the 
new regime (as to goods)112 (repair, replacement, price reduction and damages);113 there is 
                                               
103 International Computers Ltd v St Albans District Council [1996] 4 All ER 481 and SAM Business Systems v 
Hedley (unreported).  
104 Beta Computers (Europe) Ltd v Adobe Systems Ltd [1996] SLT 604. In Software Incubator Ltd v Computer 
Associates [2018] EWCA Civ 518, the Court of Appeal held that software did not fall under the definition of “goods” 
in Reg.2(1) of the Commercial Agents (Council Directive) Regulations 1993 (overturning the High Court on this 
point).  
105 Salvage Association v CAP [1995] FSR 654. 
106 SGSA, s. 13-for B2C contracts, now CRA, s. 49.  
107 Murphy v Brentwood DC [1990] 1 AC 398. 
108 See Part 1, ch.3 Consumer Rights Act 2015 (ss. 33-47). 
109 Sections 34 and 35 Consumer Rights Act 2015. 
110 If the supplier obtained the defective CAD file from another party, there may be the possibility of channelling 
liability along the contractual chain, although the supplier will not be able to rely on the provisions of the Consumer 
Rights Act 2015 but would have to make out a case based on the common law position and the terms of its supply 
contract.  
111 Consumer Rights Act 2015, section 33(1). 
112 See supra, fn 00.  
113 Consumer Rights Act 2015, ss. 42-44. 
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no right to reject as such, although a price reduction can where appropriate amount to a full 
refund.114  
These developments in the law involve a relatively modest doctrinal extension: in that 
contractual suppliers are made strictly liable not only (as previously) for qualitatively defective 
goods, but also (by analogy) for qualitatively defective digital content. So, while the approach 
taken can be said to be a values-driven approach in that the changes manage to ensure that 
the law responds to innovation by retaining an underpinning ethic of need; this is achievable 
here without a radical deviation from doctrinal tradition.115  
The practical result is that consumers have recourse where a CAD-file to be used for 3D 
printing has shortcomings with regard to the quality and fitness for purpose of the design or 
the integrity of the file itself. However, this leaves unresolved at least some instances where 
for example a CAD-file supplied to a consumer leads to the consumer producing (on a home 
printer) a product that causes injury. Of course, in many cases consumers will be able to claim 
for the injury based on there being a breach of the (above discussed) strict liability contractual 
conformity obligations owed by the supplier: if the condition of digital content is such that it 
makes the finally produced goods unsafe this will normally mean that this digital content (the 
CAD-file) is of unsatisfactory quality. However, this form of recourse will not be available to 
the consumer injured by the finally produced goods where the supplier of the CAD-file has 
since become insolvent; and it will not be available where the party injured by the defect did 
not actually buy the goods under a contract with the supplier, but for instance received it as a 
gift. Equally, bystanders injured by the goods will not have contractual rights. In such cases it 
will be important to know whether there is strict (tort based) product liability on the producer. 
In this connection, in particular, there is the question of whether a CAD file (or indeed any form 
of digital content) is a ‘product’ for the purpose of strict (tort) product liability law.116 There is 
no clear answer to this.117 Indeed, product liability law has long remained unreformed, but the 
need to address issues relating to the digital age may be a spur for it to be seriously 
reviewed.118 It would therefore be desirable to clarify/extend the current product liability regime 
such that it clearly applies to digital content,119 which would mean that a CAD file would be 
treated in the same way as a product. So there would be strict tort product liability for instance 
in cases where a consumer acquires a CAD-file, this causes a home printed item to be 
defective and leads to injury (but where for the sorts of reasons set out above) the consumer 
has no redress in contract law. This is a position advocated by many scholars120 and indeed 
                                               
114 S. 44 (2). 
115 See supra, Part I for the foundational analysis of these issues as to values and doctrinal tradition.  
116 Section 1(2)(c) of the Consumer Protection Act 1987 defines products as “any goods…”, which imports the 
same difficulties already mentioned with regard to the pre-Consumer Rights Act 2015 difficulty of interpreting 
“goods” to include “software”. 
117 See Whittaker, Liability for Products (Oxford University Press, 2005), p.477. 
118 There is an indication that this issue will be addressed by the European Commission in due course: see 
European Commission, Artificial Intelligence for Europe COM (2018) 237 final, p.15. 
119 Cf. European Parliament Resolution of 3 July 2018, Three-dimensional printing: intellectual property rights and 
civil liability, paras 11-12. 
120For a discussion see inert alia, Whittaker “European Product Liability and Intellectual Products’ (1989) 105 LQR 
125; Alheit, “The Applicability of the EC Product Liability Directive to Software” (2001) 34 Comparative and 
International Law Journal of Southern Africa 188 and Howells/Twigg-Flesner/”Willett, “Product Liability and Digital 
Products”, supra, fn 00. 
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implemented by some states.121 However, this is not a radical change, but merely clarifies that 
that software falls under the same rules as product generally.  
As with introducing strict contract liability, introduction of strict tort liability for digital content 
(including CAD-files) would be values-driven (responding to innovation by retaining an 
underpinning ethic of need). Yet, as with the case of contract law, this would be achievable 
without radically departing from doctrinal tradition: producers are already strictly liable in tort 
for tangible products and all that is proposed is to make them liable by analogical extension 
(or perhaps even clarification) for digital content.  
 
4. The boundary between “hobbyists” and “professionals” 
Thus far, it has been shown that the need ethic should and can be maintained for several key 
features of 3D-printing: in some cases, with no changes to existing laws, and in other cases 
by modest clarification/extension of laws. However, we now turn to a further difficult challenge. 
The need ethic is reflected in strict liability rules, but these are strict liability rules that a 
consumer benefits from only when dealing with a professional seller: as discussed in Part II, 
the whole point is that there is typically considerable imbalance of power and resources 
between consumer and professional, justifying a need-oriented consumer protection regime. 
In contrast individual private parties involved in making and selling things are only subject to 
the general rules of contract and tort law: this typically meaning in contract law there being 
liability only where express commitments have been made, and in tort there being liability 
where there is negligence (based on breach of an established duty of care).  
The digital revolution and sharing economy are disruptive in this regard because they allow 
perhaps more scope than ever before for individuals to compete with traditional forms of 
commerce. This is seen most obviously with taxis (Uber) and hotels (Airbnb). 3D printing is 
not part of the sharing economy – individuals do not yet regularly lend out their 3D printers. 
Printing services are mainly commercial operations, with only a few basic desktop 3D-printers 
currently available on the consumer market. However, the 3D-printing economy does give 
individuals more options to become CAD-file designers, and eventually producers of finished 
items (especially once more sophisticated 3D home printers become available).122 Individuals 
can create designs for fun, work on each other’s designs, and even help businesses with 
design projects (whether gratuitously or in return for some remuneration).  
The question then is what is to become of the need ethic in these circumstances. The risks of 
defects are possibly even higher with hobby designers, producers and sellers involved. The 
consumer customer is as vulnerable as ever in terms of having limited resources to absorb 
losses. On these grounds the need ethic should apply and this should be expressed in strict 
liability standards. However, as indicated above, also key to the justification for the need ethic 
is the power imbalance: The idea is that while consumers are vulnerable in having limited 
ability to bargain to protect their interests and limited capacity to absorb losses, professional 
producers and suppliers are stronger in these regards. They are experienced in quality control; 
                                               
121Under the Australian Consumer Law goods includes software, Schedule 2 s.2. 
122 Anderson, Makers – The New Industrial Revolution (Random House, 2013). 
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skilled and experienced in protecting their interests through bargaining and perhaps issuing 
warnings to consumers that may restrict their responsibilities; and they typically have the 
resources to absorb the losses they suffer when required to provide remedies to consumers.  
For sure, it would probably be inappropriate to impose need oriented strict liability standards 
on hobby suppliers who display none of these characteristics i.e. who are no different from the 
typical non-professional player that the law has never previously imposed such standards on. 
However, as indicated above in the 3D-printing economy there are more opportunities for 
individuals to design CAD-files and eventually to become producers of finished items; so there 
may be many more hobbyists who come closer (than hobbyists in the ‘old’ economy) to looking 
like professionals: e.g. in terms of level of profit, capacity to bear losses etc. This poses a 
challenge for the law. The difficulty is in determining when should such parties turn from being 
regarded as hobbyist “non-traders” to being considered professional traders with strict liability 
responsibilities that provide need-oriented protection to the consumers they deal with and 
affect.  
Indeed, the EU has recently noted the increasing difficulty for consumers in being able to tell 
whether they are dealing with a trader or an individual.123 It has proposed to require an online 
platform to inform a consumer whether they are dealing with a trader.124 This might help when 
a trader is using a platform to disguise their commercial nature, but it is of little use in 
determining whether someone is a trader or not in the first place. Their own self-declaration 
cannot be definitive. Additionally, there is recent CJEU guidance for determining in the context 
of EU law whether activities are of a business nature. These do not mention explicitly the 
factors suggested here in the text but are certainly broad enough to encapsulate them: in 
particular, whether transactions are carried out in an organised manner; whether they are 
intended to generate profit; whether the seller has relevant expertise that the buyer lacks; the 
legal status of the seller; whether the seller received remuneration or another incentive for 
conducting transactions; whether the seller purchased new or second hand goods to re-sell 
them; and whether the goods were al of the same type.125 It will still require a case-by-case 
analysis and a degree of uncertainty remains. 
The Consumer Rights Act 2015 imposes strict contractual liability on a “trader”, defined as “a 
person acting for purposes relating to that person’s trade, business, craft or profession, 
whether acting personally or through another person acting in the trader’s name or on the 
trader’s behalf”.126 However, that definition leaves open how one determines which activities 
would constitute a person’s trade, business, craft or profession. In the past, the courts in the 
UK have taken account of the regularity or volume of transactions entered into by an individual 
                                               
123 European Commission, Proposal for a Directive as regards better enforcement and modernisation of EU 
consumer protection rules (COM (2018) 185). See Loos, “The Modernisation of European Consumer Law: A Pig 
in a Poke” (2019) 27 European Review of Private Law (forthcoming); Twigg-Flesner, “Bad Hand? The ‘New Deal’ 
for EU Consumers” (2018) 15 GPR 166. 
124 See draft Art.2(4), which would insert a new Article 6a into the Consumer Rights Directive (2011/83/EU) and 
introduce a number of information obligations on “online marketplaces”, including “whether the third party offering 
the goods, services or digital content is a trader or not, on the basis of the declaration of that third party to the 
online marketplace”. 
125 C-105/17 Komisia za zashtita na potrebitelite v Evelina Kamenova ECLI:EU:C:2018:808 (judgment of 4 October 
2018), paras [38]-[40]. 
126 Section 2(2) Consumer Rights Act 2015. 
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with a view to profit-the greater the regularity and volume the more likely the activities are to 
be considered to be related to trade, business etc.127 Yet, the effect of digital technology is 
such that an individual who has designed a CAD-file for an item and offers this for purchase 
via a website for a few pounds might suddenly “sell” that file many times over, as this example 
by Osborn shows: 
 
“Suppose a college student designs a CAD file for a simple widget in her dorm room for 
fun. She uploads it to a website and puts a price of five dollars for the CAD file, thinking 
little of it. For the first three months, she sells only one – to her mother. Is she a merchant 
at this point? It would seem not. To her amazement, in the next three months – while she 
does nothing but study for classes – the widget goes viral and she sells 20,000. Is she 
now a merchant? In one sense, yes, because she has sold 20,000 of the same widget. In 
another sense, no, because she expended no more effort and became no more 
sophisticated than when her mother was her only customer.”128 
 
Therefore, an unqualified ‘frequency or regularity of transactions for profit’ test may not be 
appropriate on its own. As this example shows, it could mean that someone is converted into 
a trader (by events outside their control) after they had completed their act of supply. A more 
nuanced approach to regularity might be required, whereby the question would be how often 
the ‘hobbyist’ in question actually takes steps to supply designs (e.g. how regularly they post 
files). Account should arguably also be taken of such factors as whether they take action in 
the form of marketing or advertising to promote sales; and whether they post and promote 
different designs. These indicatively business patterns of behaviour justify imposition of strict 
liability not least because the regular engagement is likely to bring greater experience and 
therefore perhaps more awareness of the need to self-protect e.g. by insuring against liability 
to consumers. Also of course larger profits are likely to be generated enabling the suppliers to 
absorb the costs of providing remedies to consumers if things go wrong.  
There is a case for providing some form of clarification that elaborates on the statutory test to 
include these sorts of criteria as to how regularly someone posts files, their marketing and 
advertising activities, and the range of designs they post and promote. Rather than amending 
the Consumer Rights Act 2015 directly (or, indeed, other relevant legislation), this could be 
done in the guidance accompanying the Act, which already include examples on a variety of 
issues relevant to particular sectors.129  Achieving greater clarity on the dividing line between 
trader and hobbyist would help to ensure that need based strict liability would apply only where 
it is most appropriate: a values driven approach that imposes strict liability where the traditional 
rationales genuinely apply in the new digital context. It would not involve doctrinal disruption, 
                                               
127 Davies v Sumner [1984] 1 WLR 1301 (HL); R & B Customs Brokers Co. Ltd v United Dominions Trust Ltd [1988] 
1 WLR 321 (CA). 
128 Osborn, “Regulating Three-Dimensional Printing: The Converging World of Bits and Atoms” (2014) 51 San 
Diego Law Review 553, 573. 
129  Explanatory Notes to the Consumer Rights Act, available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2015/15/fns/contents [last accessed 27 October 2018], 
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rather a simple clarification to adapt the legal standard to the new conditions of this particular 
aspect of the digital economy.  
What about strict liability in tort? As explained above, this provides recourse to the injured 
consumer where there is no recourse against the contractual supplier e.g. due to their 
insolvency, or because the injured party did not receive anything under a supply contract but 
rather as a gift or was simply injured as a bystander. Here a producer has a defence under 
the strict product liability regime only where they are not acting in the course of a business or 
with a view for profit.130 So, the defence is unavailable where a product is distributed with a 
view to profit even if the producer does not act like a business in any of the other ways 
discussed above (e.g. no regularity of production and supply, no advertising and promotion 
etc.).  
Now this is perhaps a rather harsh outcome for a hobbyist who designs a file or makes a 
product only once for profit and is unlucky enough for there to be a defect and for someone to 
be injured. However, this has always been the case for products in general under this regime. 
The only difference now would be that under the proposal made above at (iii) the liability would 
now cover defective CAD-files supplied for profit. Of course there remains a good case for this 
approach, based on the need ethic: the physical well-being of consumers is at stake, and the 
producer has sought and received a profit. Nevertheless, it is true that such liability may well 
come as a shock to an individual who would not anticipate being caught by product liability 
rules and therefore would be unlikely to be insured; and this may have a chilling effect on 
individuals utilising 3D-printing as a hobby and potentially enriching the market with worthwhile 
designs.  
One possible solution might be to create a new, intermediate category of “micro-producer”, 
under which the profit-making hobbyist is liable but only up to a fixed amount of a few hundred 
or a few thousand pounds.131 However, this this might unduly complicate matters, as the law 
would then be required to tackled two different ‘grey areas’, i.e., that between micro producer 
and full producer, and that between micro producer and outright hobbyist. To take just one 
possible criterion, the basis of the amount of profit made: what level of profit would be used to 
mark out the distinctions between the different categories? And if this turned out not to be a 
good criterion, what alternatives would be preferable? The sensible conclusion then may be 
that to ensure need oriented strict liability protection for consumers it is sufficient to retain and 
manage the current approach whereby hobbyists are strictly liable in tort even on the basis of 
a single supply for profit: although perhaps there is a case for some form of education 
campaign to inform hobbyists of the risks involved.   
 
5. Radical deviation from doctrinal tradition: Network Liability 
Given the greater role in the 3D-printing economy for “hobbyists”, some of whom may not 
satisfy the criteria to be strictly liable for quality or safety defects, this discussion now turns to 
                                               
130 S. 4(1)(c) Consumer Protection Act 1987. 
131 Cf. Berkowitz, “Strict Liability for Individuals? The impact of 3-D printing on Products Liability Law” (2014) 92 
Washington University Law Review 1019, 1043-1052  
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the question whether preservation of the need ethic may require a new approach that extends 
liability beyond traditional doctrinal boundaries-some form of network liability or insurance fund 
system.  
It was explained in Part II that 3D-printing is one instance where two risks to consumers arise 
simultaneously: the first is the spread of what is still a relatively new form of technology, and 
the second is the potential of this new technology to enable non-experts to both design and 
produce 3D-printed items. Then the section immediately preceding here (section (iv) above in 
this Part), highlighted the uncertainties often involved in distinguishing between those that do 
and do not cross the threshold to be strictly liable to consumers. Certain clarifications were 
then proposed in relation to contractual supply i.e. making it clear that business status (and 
the accompanying strict liability responsibility) should depend on regularity of supply, 
significant marketing and advertising, and there being a range of designs that are posted and 
promoted. Now it seems quite likely that there may be significant numbers of suppliers in the 
3D sector who, based on such criteria, are not considered to be business suppliers. Equally, 
there may be significant numbers of hobby producers who do supply for profit at all and 
therefore do not cross the threshold to make them strictly liable in tort (above at section (iv) in 
this Part).  
There may therefore be a greater risk that consumers will not have a remedy for quality defects 
or injuries caused by 3D-printed products. Now consumers might seek to exercise self-reliance 
to protect themselves against these risks: determining whether what they buy comes from 
non-professional suppliers or producers (who will not be strictly liable) and either negotiating 
express guarantees as to quality or safety or insuring against the risks. However, such self-
reliant action is especially challenging for consumers in this context. In traditional sales it may 
sometimes be easy for a consumer to recognise that a seller is another private individual e.g., 
at a car-boot sale. However, this is much more difficult in an on-line environment; and it is 
especially difficult to determine the status of the producers who sit at least one further level 
beyond suppliers in the network and who consumers will rarely have any contact with.  
So, what can be done to fill the potential strict liability gap and retain a strong need ethic? A 
solution to this would be a type of ‘network’ liability, fixing parties in the production and supply 
network with liabilities they would not traditionally have; to plug gaps caused by the presence 
of non-professional hobbyist sellers and producers. There will, for example, be instances when 
a hobbyist has utilised the services of a professional 3D-printing service to create an item, 
before the hobbyist then sells the finished item to a customer. As discussed (at section (ii) 
above in this Part) this professional printing service will under existing rules be a producer and 
therefore strictly liable in tort for injury. However this strict tort liability does not include liability 
for pure quality defects;132 and while a professional seller will be contractually responsible for 
such quality defects the hobbyist seller who does not cross the threshold of being a 
professional business seller will not be so responsible (see section (iv) above in this Part).  
                                               
132 The regime only covers injury or damage to property, this not including damage to the defective product itself 
(Consumer Protection Act 1987, s. 5 (1)-(2)). 
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So one form of network liability could involve extending the liability of the printing 
service/producer: to include liability for pure quality defects. This would fill the gap left by the 
hobbyist seller in the scenario described. It would be a fairly radical departure from doctrinal 
tradition and policy: the UK government and the EU have previously rejected or ignored 
arguments for imposing strict liability for quality defects on producers;133 and the English courts 
have even refused to countenance liability for quality defects caused by negligence. 134 
Nevertheless, strict producer liability for quality defects (at least in this sector) may be 
necessary if the law is to continue to reflect the need ethic in this new technical environment: 
a case of adherence to the need ethic requiring radical deviation from doctrinal tradition.135 It 
must also be remembered that by comparison with either the consumer affected by the loss 
or the hobbyist seller such producers/printing service providers are better placed to absorb 
losses: they will usually have greater resources and be well placed to insure against the losses.   
Another possible scenario is that a hobbyist may supply via an online platform. Here if the 
hobbyist does not cross the threshold to be a professional business supplier, the hobbyist will 
not be contractually liable for quality/safety defects. Indeed, let us also suppose that this 
hobbyist (or another hobbyist) is the producer of the defective goods (or of the CAD-file that 
is the source of the defect). If such a hobby producer did not act for profit, then they would not 
even be liable for injury under the strict liability tort regime (see (4) above). Generally speaking, 
the online platform through which the contractual supply to the customer was made is merely 
an intermediary, because the actual contract for the supply of the goods is between the hobby 
seller and the customer. Therefore, the platform itself is not contractually liable for the quality 
or safety of the goods. Moreover, as the platform is not a producer, at is also not liable in tort.   
However, if the case for network liability is accepted in principle, then the particular role of 
online platforms in facilitating transactions would make this a further key area for applying 
network liability.136 This would mean making the platform strictly liable for the safety and/or 
quality of the goods supplied by hobbyist suppliers through that platform. Doing so would 
certainly be a more radical deviation from doctrinal tradition. Intermediaries do not usually bear 
any immediate responsibility for the quality or safety of goods (assuming they have made no 
representations that might e.g. engage liability via a collateral contract,137 or, in even for fraud 
or negligent misstatement). Again, however, this may be a form of doctrinal innovation that is 
required in order to help to ensure that the law continues to reflect the need ethic, by filling the 
gap caused by the hobbyist sellers/producers in the scenario described. In particular, it would 
                                               
133 Seminally, Bradgate/Twigg-Flesner, “Expanding the boundaries of liability for quality defects” (2002) 25 Journal 
of Consumer Policy 342; see also Willett, “Direct Producer Liability” in: Howells/Schulze, Modernising and 
Harmonising Consumer Contract Law (Sellier European Law Publishers, 2009). 
134 Murphy v Brentwood D.C. [1991] 1 AC 398.  
135 It is beyond the scope of this paper to review the case for introducing such liability for sectors generally, but see 
Bradgate/Twigg-Flesner, “Expanding the boundaries of liability for quality defects” and Willett, “Direct Producer 
Liability” supra, fn 00.    
136 The literature on the potential liability of online intermediary platforms is growing, but it is beyond the scope of 
this paper to engage with this literature in detail. See e.g., Helberger/Pierson/Poell, “Governing Online Platforms: 
from contested to cooperative responsibility” (2018) 34 The Information Society 1; Rodriguez de las Heras Ballell, 
“The Legal Anatomy of Electronic Platforms: A prior study to assess the need of a Law of Platforms in the EU” 
(2017) 3 Italian Law Journal 149, or Busch/ Schulte-Nölke/Wiewiorowska-Domagalska/Zoll, “The Rise of the 
Platform Economy: A New Challenge for EU Consumer Law?”  (2016) 5 EuCML 3 
137 Shanklin Pier v Detel Products LD [1951] 2 All ER 471. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3283181 
31 
 
also channel liability towards a party with better resources and the ability to obtain insurance 
cover in respect of such liability: and a party who may ‘only’ be an agent but who clearly 
benefits from their position in this network and the profits they make from the hobbyists 
involved in the network. 
Network liability would not be a complete leap into the unknown, of course, but rather build on 
established extension of traditional contract liability. Perhaps the most notable model for such 
an approach is the connected lender liability provision in section 75 of the Consumer Credit 
Act 1974. This imposes liability on a credit card company for matters such as the supply of 
poor quality goods, which is concurrent to that of a seller of goods or supplier of services to 
consumers, and allows consumers to have recourse against the credit card company on the 
same terms as against the seller/supplier.138 
One difficulty with a network liability approach might be its complexity. Suppose a scenario 
that a hobbyist CAD-file designer has an item printed by a shop and then supplies it through 
a platform. This combines the two potential areas of application discussed above. In such a 
situation, clear choices would need to be made as whether the liability should only be extended 
to the printing shop or the platform, or whether the particular network in this instance 
encompasses both.  
A further question arises once one party in the network has taken the position of the liable 
party towards the final consumer, which is how the network should allocate the costs of this 
amongst its members.139 One solution some kind of collective fund which could be used to 
recompense the person who provided a remedy to the final consumer. Alternatively, it might 
be simpler to impose liability more ‘collectively’ on the network. There could be an insurance 
fund, which could be financed through a small surcharge on the sale of 3D-printers as well as 
every time a professional 3D-printing service produces a physical item. Consumers affected 
by poor quality and dangerous items would then claim from the insurance fund.  
One way or another, if we are to take a values-driven approach then a degree of doctrinal 
disruption in the form of some form of network liability may be required: to deal with the 
democratisation of production and supply in the 3D-printing sector, which brings a significant 
hobbyist element into play. Indeed, while not calling for this specific solution the European 
Parliament has already recently recognised that there is a problem: highlighting the difficulty 
for consumers to identify the person responsible for a problem with a 3D-printed product, and 
calling for a better definition of the responsibilities of all the parties involved in a 3D-printing 
process.140 
  
                                               
138 Here the need oriented rationale is not that there are hobbyists who cause gaps in the liability system, more 
that it may be at least easier for consumers to obtain redress from a credit card company than traders who may 
perhaps be small in size; and that credit card companies are well resourced to cover the losses and benefit from 
their part in the network.   
139 For a detailed analysis of network liability, see Bradgate/Twigg-Flesner, “Expanding the boundaries of liability 
for quality defects”, supra, fn 00. 
140 European Parliament Resolution of 3 July 2018, Three-dimensional printing: intellectual property rights and civil 
liability, Recital AE and paragraph 14. 
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IV. Concluding Comments: consumer law values, 3D-printing and the 
wider digital revolution 
Using 3D-printing as a case study, this paper has provided a new theoretical framework for 
dealing with the challenges of digital innovation for consumer law. This is a framework that 
stresses the importance of underpinning values in determining how consumer law doctrine 
should respond to technological innovations. This framework holds that in deciding if 
underpinning values should change, legal policy should not underestimate either perennial 
risks and consumer vulnerabilities; or the scope for these risks and vulnerabilities to be 
increased by technological innovations. Neither should legal policy overestimate the risk that 
adherence to protective underpinning values will hamper innovation.  
It has been shown that a need ethic currently underpins consumer private law, reflected in 
particular through strict liability standards of quality and safety. The argument has been that 
this ethic should continue to underpin rules applicable to 3D-printing, not least because 
consumer vulnerabilities and the risks from which the law seeks to protect consumer are just 
as, if not more, prevalent in the 3D-printing market. Preserving these values will generally not 
be a real threat to innovation.  
The paper has then used this approach to develop a set of original doctrinal solutions to the 
distinctive quality and safety issues arising in the 3D-printing market. Despite the innovations 
and risks brought by 3D-printing, existing laws can often continue to promote the need ethic: 
albeit with some important extensions and clarifications related to digital content and who 
should count as a professional business supplier. In some instances, however, there may 
need to be a more radical departure form doctrinal tradition: forms of ‘network’ liability, 
whereby responsibilities are re-allocated to businesses such as 3D-printing service providers 
and internet platforms that are not subject to liability under traditional legal rules and principles. 
The analysis provided here is based on UK law, but its significance extends far beyond the 
UK. 3D-printing technology is developing across the world. 141  The same risks (of new 
technology and inexperienced producers and suppliers) will apply across national borders, as 
will similar perennial power imbalances between businesses and consumers. In addition, strict 
liability doctrine applicable to goods is the norm in very many jurisdictions: e.g. across the EU, 
in Australia, Canada and New Zealand;142 so the same questions will arise as to whether and 
how (doctrinally) to adhere to the underpinning need ethic.  
Indeed legal orders beyond the UK have already begun to consider some of the questions that 
arise in relation to 3D-printing and the digital economy more generally-the so called digital 
fourth industrial revolution.143 What have often emerged are arguments supporting what we 
have presented here. For instance EU legal policy continues to assert the need for strong 
consumer protection.144 At the same time the recent European Commission REFIT study 
                                               
141 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Information Economy Report 2017 – 
Digitalization, Trade and Development, p. 7. 
142 See supra, fn 00. 
143 Schwab, The Fourth Industrial Revolution, (Crown, 2017) 
144 See the discussion in Howells/Twigg-Flesner/Wilhelmsson, Rethinking EU Consumer Law (Routledge, 2017), 
ch.1. 
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found that by and large EU consumer laws remained fit for purpose even in the online world.145 
Of course, again in line with our arguments, it is also recognised that there is a need for some 
modification and the proposal for a directive on digital content146 is one response, as is the 
impetus new technologies have given to the review of the product liability directive.147 The 
question then is in what circumstances more radical doctrinal deviation may be required in 
order to hold on to protective values. Here we discussed network liability for printing service 
providers and platforms on the 3D-printing sector. However, there may be a case for some 
similar form of liability on platforms in the sharing economy sector (e.g. Uber, AirBnB). These 
platforms also bring together consumers and potentially inexperienced suppliers, play an 
active and profitable role in the transaction and there is arguably a case to shift them from 
their traditional agent status to bearing at least some direct responsibility to consumers who 
may otherwise struggle to obtain redress.148  
3D printing is part of a much larger digital revolution – big data, cloud computing, Artificial 
Intelligence, the Internet of Things and the sharing/platform economy are just a few well know 
examples of how the consumer society is being revolutionised. There are numerous highly 
technical public law regulations on safety and technical compliance that provide mechanisms 
for society to guide the development of this digital revolution;149 and increasingly we will see 
calls to develop ethical guidelines. Our argument is that at least as far as private law doctrine 
is concerned the law is often fairly technology neutral and future proof. However, the 
framework developed here provides a methodology to stress test private law to ensure it is fit 
to meet the challenges of 3D printing and other innovations of the Fourth Industrial Age.  
To sum up, our framework broadly involves: (i) identifying the underpinning values of an area 
of law; (ii) identifying how these values manifest in specific rules; (iii) asking whether there is 
a reason to see these values changed by considering whether risks are lesser or greater than 
before, whether parties are more or less able to look after themselves and whether innovation 
is seriously threatened by sticking to the traditional values; (iv) if there are good reasons to 
stick to the traditional values, considering whether the existing specific rules can apply to new 
circumstances created by the innovations, either with no change or with adaptation or 
development that does not fundamentally change the legal regime; and (v) if radical regime 
change is needed to reflect traditional values, finding solutions that are workable and 
proportionate.  
                                               
145 Executive summary of the Fitness Check SWD (2017) 208 final. 
146 European Commission, Proposal for a directive on certain aspects concerning contracts for the supply of 
digital content (COM (2015) 634 final). 
147 Evaluation of Council Directive 85/373/EEC of 25 July on the approximation of the laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions of the Member States concerning liability for defective products SWD (2018) 157 final 
148 For a discussion of the issues, see Twigg-Flesner, “Disruptive Technology – Disrupted Law?” in: De Franceschi 
(ed.), European Contract Law and the Digital Single Market (Intersentia, 2016), 36-7 
149 E.g., General Product Safety Regulations 2005 (S.I. 2005/1803), implementing the General Product Safety 
Directive (2001/95/EC) or the Supply of Machinery (Safety) Regulations 2008 (S.I. 2008/1597) implementing the 
Machinery Directive (2006/42/EC). 
